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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 20001114-CA 
v. : 
JOYCE POWELL, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a clandestine laboratory in 
drug-free zone, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp. 
2001), in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Ray M. Harding, Sr., presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)0)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request to 
submit an exhibit into evidence where that document was merely cumulative of testimony 
already given? 
1 
Standard of Review: "In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence . . . , [an appellate court] will not overturn the court's determination unless it was 
an "abuse of discretion." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993); accord State 
v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 979 (1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp. 2001); 
Utah R. Evid. 608; 
Utah R. Evid. 403. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of a clandestine laboratory" 
in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony. R. 1-2. A jury convicted defendant as charged. 
R. 112. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of five-years-to-life 
in the Utah State Prison. R. 123; 140. Defendant timely appeals her conviction. R. 129. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On February 16,2000, defendant spent the day gathering laboratory equipment, 
including a home-made condenser, in preparation for condensing methamphetamine oil 
into usable methamphetamine. R. 143:65-71, 77-79. That evening, defendant and her 
two friends, Joann Ford and Michael Westbrook, brought the lab equipment to a room at 
1
 The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, J 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
2 
the Western Inn Motel in Spanish Fork. R. 142:59-60; 143:79-81, 86-87, 90. Defendant 
called her boyfriend, Brian Marchant, and asked him to pick up the methamphetamine oil 
which she had "cooked" several days earlier, and bring it to the motel. R. 143:20-21, 68-
69, 78. Defendant then offered set-up instructions and helped her two inexperienced 
friends construct the lab. R. 143:25-27, 29, 49-52, 54-56, 69, 80-81, 86-90. A short time 
later, Marchant and his friend Brian Libbey arrived. R. 143:78. Around 11:00 p.m. 
defendant gave Ford and Westbrook instructions on condensing the meth oil, and they 
began the condensing process in the bathroom. R. 143:25-27, 29, 49-52, 54-56, 69, 79-
81, 86-90. Defendant then went to sleep on the bed nearest the outside window. R. 
143:29-30, 81-82. 
The bust. Acting on an informant's tip, Detective Richard Hales observed the 
comings and goings of defendant and her friends from their motel room for over an hour 
that night. R. 142:60-67. At one point, Detective Hales observed defendant and Ford 
carrying various items including grocery sacks into the motel room. R. 142:64-65. Based 
on that investigation, Detective Hales obtained a no-knock warrant. R. 142:67-68. 
In the early morning hours on February 17, 2000, after a failed attempt to open the 
motel room door with a key, Detective Hales and several other officers forced the door 
open with a metal ramming pole. R. 142:68-70. Inside the room, the officers 
encountered Westbrook nearest the door and Ford in the bathroom breaking the glass lab 
equipment in an attempt to destroy any evidence of the lab. R. 142:71, 73, 76. Defendant 
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and Marchant were on the bed closest to the outside window, and Libbey was on the other 
bed. R. 142:74-75. Steam and fluid were coming out of the pressurized cooking pan on a 
heating mantle near the sink. R. 142:73. Some of the fluid, later determined to be an acid 
base, landed on Detective Hales' sweatshirt, eating a hole in it. R. 142:73-74, 152. The 
officers also discovered various other chemicals in the room used to produce meth. R. 
142:136-70, 192-205. Shortly thereafter, police arrested defendant, Ford, Westbrook, 
Libbey, and Marchant. R. 1-2,4. 
Trial testimony. At trial, Libbey and Ford testified about defendant's involvement 
with the lab. R. 143:16-105. Libbey testified that defendant lay on the bed that evening 
directing Ford and Westbrook to connect the condensing pump to the sink and instructing 
them on how to use the sink to cook the meth. R. 143:27-29. Libbey heard defendant 
repeatedly tell Ford and Westbrook "not to mess up [my] stuff." R. 143:29, 59-61. On 
the night of his arrest, when police asked Libbey who was involved in cooking the meth, 
he told them that it was defendant. R. 143:56. 
Libbey also testified that he had entered a plea agreement with officers in 
exchange for his testimony against defendant. R. 143:18-19, 31-35. To confirm that 
agreement, Libbey's attorney prepared a letter addressed to the prosecutor—Exhibit 38— 
under Libbey's direction, detailing the events which occurred at the hotel the night of his 
arrest. See Exhibit 38—a letter from Attorney Randall Gaither addressed to the 
prosecutor; attached as Addendum B. The letter outlines what Libbey will testify to at 
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trial. Id. At the bottom of the letter is an initialed and dated handwritten paragraph 
indicating defendant's involvement with the meth lab. Id. At trial, Libbey answered 
numurous questions regarding Exhibit 38 during both direct and cross examination, and 
discussed in detail the contents of that document, its history, and its format. R. 143:28-
29, 35-45,49-52. 
Ford also testified for the prosecution at trial. R. 143:64-103. Ford told the jury 
that she and defendant had cooked the meth oil several days earlier, and that she went 
with defendant on February 16, 2000 to Salt Lake, where defendant picked up the 
homemade condensing tube from her friend. R. 143:67-69,77-78. Ford had never used a 
pressure cooking pan to condense meth, so that night defendant showed Ford and 
Westbrook how to set up the lab. R. 143:80-81, 86, 89-90,102. Then, while lying in bed, 
defendant gave them further instructions on running the lab. R. 143:81.2 
2At trial, defendant argued that Ford was not credible because she had acted as a 
confidential informant for Officer Sean Bufton. R. 143:5-8. Prior to her trial, Ford 
agreed to act as a confidential informant on a matter unrelated to defendant's case or trial. 
Id. In exchange for Ford's agreement, Bufton wrote a letter to the judge in Ford's case, 
indicating Ford's redeeming work with the police. R. 143:5-6. Ford's work as a 
confidential informant ended, however, prior to defendant's prosecution began. R. 
143:12-13. At trial, defendant asked the court's permission to question Ford about 
Bufton's letter. R. 143:6-7. The trial court denied defendant's request stating that the 
letter would be highly prejudicial, but it did allow defendant to question Ford about her 
working relationship with Bufton. R. 143:8-9, 13-14. 
Unlike Libbey, Ford received no promise from the police, Bufton, or the 
prosecutor in exchange for her testimony. R. 143:96-99,103,115. Ford considered 
Bufton to be a friend. R. 143:76,96-98. Because of her good relationship with Bufton, 
when he asked her to testify against defendant, Ford agreed to do so. R. 143:96-99,103, 
115. At trial, Ford testified that her only motive in testifying against defendant was to 
"tell the truth." R. 96-99. 
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ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying her request to submit Exhibit 
38, the letter from Libbey's attorney to the prosecutor outlining Libbey's testimony and 
noting defendant's involvement with meth lab, into evidence as impeachment evidence. 
Defendant's claim fails, however, because during Libbey's testimony he restated Exhibit 
38, describing it in great detail. Because the jury was plainly aware of the content and 
history of that document, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying its 
admission as needlessly cumulative under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In any event, where Ford's testimony strongly corroborated Libbey's statements 
about defendant's involvement with the meth lab, defendant cannot show that she was 
prejudiced by the trial court's action. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
REQUEST TO SUBMIT EXHIBIT 38 INTO 
EVIDENCE; IN ANY EVENT, BECAUSE IT WAS 
MERELY CUMULATIVE OF A DETAILED IN-COURT 
DESCRIPTION OF THAT DOCUMENT, ANY ERROR 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION REQUEST 
WAS HARMLESS 
Defendant claims that the trial court's decision not to admit Exhibit 38 was in 
error. Br. of Aplt. at 10-12. Specifically, defendant claims that the document should 
have been admitted under rule 608(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, as impeachment evidence 
establishing co-defendant Libbey's alleged motive to misrepresent defendant's 
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involvement with the meth lab. Id. Defendant's claim lacks merit because the document 
defendant sought to admit was merely cumulative evidence. 
During direct examination at trial, the prosecutor asked Libbey to explain 
defendant's involvement with the lab. R. 143:27. Libbey replied that defendant was 
answering Westbrook and Ford's questions, "telling them what to do[,]"and how to hook 
the apparatus up to the sink. Id. In response to further questioning by the prosecutor, 
Libbey then testified that while acting under his attorney's advice, he had previously 
filled out an affidavit indicating his observations that night. R. 143:28. At that point, the 
following colloquy occurred between Libbey and the prosecutor: 
PROSECUTOR: 
LIBBEY: 
Okay. Let me show you what—if I can, I am going to 
show you what has been marked as Exhibit 38 for 
identification and ask you to examine that more. Let 
me have you turn over the page. There is a paragraph 
written in handwriting, paragraph 8, do you recognize 
that? 
Okay. Yeah. 
PROSECUTOR: Okay. Did you write that or did your attorney write 
that? 
LIBBEY: My attorney wrote it. 
PROSECUTOR: Okay. And did you tell him what to write there? 
LIBBEY: Yeah. He wrote it based on like things I told him and 
then he went back and that was, you know, like what 
was important. 
PROSECUTOR: Okay. Can you read paragraph 8 for us? 
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LIBBEY: Yeah, [defendant] kept telling the two persons 
condensing the liquid not to mess up her stuff. She 
gave instructions to run the pump into the sink. 
And that is basically what I said. 
R. 143:28-29. 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Libbey to review Exhibit 38. R. 
143:35-36. During that colloquy, defense counsel asked detailed questions about Exhibit 
38 and received a complete description of that document from Libbey. R. 143:35-45, 49-
52. That description included 1) the name and address at the top of the document; 2) the 
location of paragraph eight at the bottom of the page; 3) the fact that only paragraph eight 
is handwritten as opposed to the seven preceding typewritten paragraphs; 4) an 
identification of the attorney's handwritten initials next to paragraph eight; 5) the specific 
content of each of the preceding seven paragraphs; 6) the date at the top of the letter and 
the date handwritten next to paragraph eight; 7) a history of the events surrounding the 
creation of that document, including who wrote the document, who was present when it 
was created, and where it was created; and 8) the nature of defendant's mental condition 
when Exhibit 38 was created. Id. 
Following the close of Libbey's testimony after additional questioning on both re-
direct and re-cross examination, defense counsel requested that Exhibit 38 be submitted 
into evidence so that the "jury [could] see the distinction between the typewritten portion 
and the handwritten portion of that letter." R. 143:52-63. The court denied that request 
without explanation. R. 143:64. 
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A. Because Exhibit 38 was described in complete detail during Libbey's 
testimony, the trial court acted within its discretion in not admitting the 
exhibit 
Rule 608(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that "[bjias, prejudice or any 
motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the 
witness or by evidence otherwise adduced." Utah R. Evid. 608(c). Rule 608(c) is 
limited, however, by rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. State v. Hackford, 1Z1 P.2d 200, 
203 (Utah 1987). "[R]ule [403] permits the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence only 
'if its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.'" Id. (quoting Utah R. 
Evid. 403). Accordingly, "[i]n reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence under rule 403, [an appellate court] will not overturn the court's determination 
unless it was an "abuse of discretion." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1221 (Utah 1993); 
accord State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 979 
(1993). Although it is preferable to have express findings regarding the factors mentioned 
in rule 403, "in the absence of such findings, [an appellate court] will still affirm if [it] 
can find some basis in the record for concluding that the trial court's action falls within 
the limits of permissible discretion under Rule 403." Hackford, 1YI P.2d at 203-04 
(citing State v. Paterson, 656 P.2d 438,438 (Utah 1982)). 
Here, although the trial court offered no express findings for its denial of 
defendant's request to submit Exhibit 38 into evidence, the record clearly reveals that the 
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exhibit was merely cumulative of Libbey's verbatim discription of that document, and 
therefore needlessly cumulative under rule 403. Upon offering Exhibit 38 for admission 
into evidence, defense counsel stated that his reason for offering that document was to 
make the jury aware of "the distinction between the typewritten portion and the 
handwritten portion of that letter." SeeR. 143:52-63. However, defendant offers no 
explanation as to how the handwriting shows bias, prejudice, or motive to misrepresent. 
See Br. of Aplt. at 9-12. Furthermore, given defense counsel's prior diligent efforts 
eliciting detailed testimony from Libbey concerning the content of Exhibit 38, the jury 
was plainly aware of the fact that paragraph eight was handwritten, initialed, and dated, as 
opposed to the preceding seven paragraphs which were typewritten at an earlier time. See 
R. 143:35-45,49-52. Additionally, the jury was aware of each of the events surrounding 
the creation of that document and that only paragraph eight addressed defendant's 
involvement with the lab. See id. Accordingly, the probative value of Exhibit 38 was 
substantially diminished by Libbey's verbatim restatement of that document. See Utah R. 
Evid. 403. Cf. State v. Knowles, 709 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1985) (transcripts amounting 
only to verbatim restatements of the witness' in-court testimony were found to be 
cumulative). Thus the trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant's 
request to submit Exhibit 38 into evidence.3 
3Moreover, where defendant was able to show the possibility of bias, prejudice, or 
motive to misrepresent for impeachment purposes by cross-examining Libbey regarding 
Exhibit 38, any further evidence including the document itself, was needless. See Utah R. 
10 
B. Given convincing corroborative testimony from co-defendant Ford, regarding 
defendant's involvement with the meth lab, the trial court's denial of 
defendant's request to submit Exhibit 38 into evidence was harmless. 
Defendant also claims that she was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of her 
request to submit Exhibit 38 into evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 12. Whether an error is 
harmless depends on such factors as "'the importance of the witness' testimony in the 
prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of 
evidence collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, 
the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength 
of the prosecution's case.'" Hackford, 111 P.2d at 205-06 (citing Delaware v. Van 
Arsdall, 476 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)). Each of these factors are met in the instant case. As 
stated above, Exhibit 38 was merely cumulative of Libbey's in-court detailed description 
of that document. Additionally, Libbey's testimony about defendant's involvement with 
the lab was strongly corroborated by Ford's testimony. Even defendant conceded the 
importance of Ford's testimony when during a in-chambers discussion, defendant argued 
to the trial court that "the entire trial, weighs and turns on the credibility of Ms. Ford. She 
is the one who is going to come in and say that [] the defendant was involved in the 
laboratory, and I think her credibility is the main issue in this case." R. 143:6-7. Because 
Evid. 403; Utah R. Evid. 608(c) ("[b]ias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence 
otherwise adduced.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, the evidence defendant sought to 
admit was in fact admitted in the form of witness testimony. See id. 
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Ford had no ulterior motive to testify (see R. 143:96-99, 103, 115), and her testimony 
nearly mirrored Libbey's testimony regarding defendant's involvement in the lab (see R. 
143:80-81, 86, 89-90, 102), Ford's testimony proved to be the linchpin in the 
prosecution's case against defendant. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of defendant's 
request to submit Exhibit 38 was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
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58-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony* 
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(lXa), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of 
a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following 
conditions occurred in adjunction with that violation: 
(a) possession of a firearm; 
(b) use of a booby trap; 
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dan-
gerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported 
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was 
created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the 
environment; 
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place 
within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school; 
(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a 
specified controlled substance; or 
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of 
cocaine base or methamphetamine base. 
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in 
Subsections (lXa) through tf) of this section occurred in conjunction with the 
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony: 
(a) probation shall not be granted; 
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and 
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense. 
History: C. IMS, 5M7d-6\ enacted by L. 
19*3, eh. 15* f 5; 1997, elu 64,1 1 * 1998, 
eh. 66,1 1; 3000, eh. 187, f 1. 
Amendment Notes). — The 1998 amend* 
ment, effective May 4, 1998, inserted "or wss 
conducted in the presence o f after "involved" in 
Subsection UXe). 
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1,2000, 
AKALTOB 
Lesser included offenses. 
Sufficiency of evidence, 
Lesser included offerees. 
Because no special verdict form was used, 
and because it was possible that the jury relied 
upon Subsection 58-37d-4(lXa) in reaching its 
verdict, which includes ail the elements for 
conviction of possession of a controlled sub* 
stance precursor, the defendant was entitled to 
reversal of his conviction for possession of a 
* deleted former Subsection (lXe), which con-
fc» cerned clandestine drug laboratory operations 
involving or conducted in the presence of per-
I* sons under 18. A similar provision was enacted 
s as Section 78-6-112.6. 
n
 Croee References. — Sentencing for felo-
nies, H 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
controlled substance precursor as a lesser in-
cluded offense of operating a methamphet-
amine laboratory. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 
98, 989 P2d 1066. 
Sufficiency of evidence. 
Where the defendant did not acknowledge, 
let alone marshal, the evidence presented at 
trial, but described only fragmented portions of 
the evidence, the Supreme Court H — I ^ ^ to 
consider his contention that the evidence was 
insufficient for conviction. State v. Hopkins, 
1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1066. 
CLANDESTINE DRUG LAB ACT 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
RULE 608. EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OP WITNESS 
(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character. The credibility of a 
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or 
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only 
to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful 
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for 
truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, 
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by 
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness1 character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the 
witness being cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does 
not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness* privilege against 
self-incrimination when examined with respect to nnatters which relate only to 
credibility. 
(c) Evidence of Bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
ADDENDUM B 
RANDALL GATTHER 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
321 SOUTH 600 EAST 
SALT LAKH CITY, UTAH 64102 
TELEPHONE: (801)53M990 
FACSIMILE (801) 53U1992 (9.U0A-H.- 5>00P.M.) 
March 6,2000 
John L. Allen 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
100 Hast Center Street Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
deliver via fax: (801) 370-8051 
Re: State v. Brie B. Libby 
Dear John, 
This letter will confirm our agreement that Mr. Libby will appear for a change of 
plea on March 10,2000 to plea guilty to die third-degree felony before the drug Court 
On his behalf, I would offer me following evidence concerning his involvement and his 
knowledge of the offense: 
1. On the evening of the arrest my client was present when Joyce called Marchant 
at Mr. Libby's house, telephone number 785-8004. 
2. Mr. Marchant indicated after die call that he was going to pick up his sister's 
coat which was at the raoteL At the timeMr. Marchant and Mr. Libby had been drinking 
quite a bh and was under die impression that they would meet with someone to get high 
that evening but had no specific plans. They left Mr. Libby's residence in Mr. Libby's 
vehicle and went to the motet 
3. Inside the motel they went to the second floor and knocked on the door. At that 
time Joyce and JoAnn were sleeping. During the period of time that they were there a 
girl arrived who was heavy set, my client does not presently recall her name but could be 
refreshed as to her name. Also, during that time one of the girls ex-husband came over. 
My client testifies that most of the time he was laying on one of the two beds and Mr. 
Marchant and Joyce were on the other bed. 
4. During die day evening before the police arrived, he noticed Mike starting to 
set up glassware and he was able to make the observations when laying on the bed by the 
mirror on the wall. He also saw containers of liquid which contained chemicals. 
5. He will indicate that there was a large glass condenser that was hooked up and 
it appeared that they were condensing substances to produce methamphetamine. 
6. He will testify that the process was ongoing when the police knocked and when 
the police were present and he saw JoAnn cut her hand while she was trying to break up 
the condenser and glassware before the police arrived. 
7. This is a general outline that he may testify and is taken from my notes. Mr. 
Libby will be happy to meet with you to go over in detail his recollections of the event. 
JDAU/GA1THER 
Attorney at Law 
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